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I. INTRODUCTION
In the beginning Plaintiff Howard Houston ("Houston") sought to bypass an examination of
the specific facts in order to obtain a quick judgment against Whittier based solely on legal grounds.
He did so by seeking partial summaryjudgment on the issue of Defendant John Hunting Whittier's
("Whittier") liability for securities fraud based on: (1) an alleged improper use of the Fifth
Amendment claiming that, as a matter of law, taking the Fifth Ainendment amounted to an
admission of the Complaint allegations; or (2) the use of issue preclusion to establish the elements
of a violation of state securities law by looking to a limited guilty plea to violating specific federal
reporting requirements. Then, after lulling Whittier into defending against and the District Court
into ruling on these narrow &gJ
issues, Houston now seeks to establish his entitlement to summary
judgment on Rule 56(c) grounds, arguing that Whittier did not dispute the factual record.
The burden, however, lo dispute these facts never shifted to Whittier given the narrow, nonfact-specific scope of the l
e
& issues raised by Houston's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The District Court did not grant summary judgment to Houston based on any alleged failure to
dispute, or otherwise meet any burden to dispute, these nonmaterial facts. The District Court,
instead, ruled on the narrow legal issues raised and determined that the Fifth Amendment argument
failed but that the limited guilty plea established all of the prima facie elements of a violation of
Oregon securities statutes, including damages. Houston cannot prevail on this new Rule 56(c)
argument.
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Therefore, the appeal hinges on two substantive issues: (1) can a limited guilty plea to
specific federal reporting requirements establish, in and of itself, all of the elements of a violation
of Oregon state securities law under issue preclusion; and (2) even if issue preclusion establishes a
violation of Oregon state securities law, should Idaho law have been applied under the mostsignificant-relationships test? As will be discussed below, the District Court incorrectly applied
issue preclusion to establish Whittier's liability and Houston's damages and incorrectly applied
Oregon law rather than Idaho law.
Nor is either of these errors harmless. If it is determined that issue preclusion does not
establish, as a matter of law, the elements of Whittier's liability and Houston's damage, Houston
must prove the elements of Whittier's liability and the amount of damages through an examination
of the specific facts applied to the proper law. For instance, since Houston is not a recipient of the
SEC reports to which Whittier pled guilty for failing to file and because there is no similar filing
requirement under either Idaho or Oregon securities law, Houston must prove that some other action
by Whittier was a violation of the proper state's securities law.'

'In reality, and as confirmed in Houston's Respondent's Brief, Houston's allegations of
securities fraud arise out of alleged misrepresentations made in the offering documents (Confidential
Private Offering Memorandum) and not from a failure to file an SEC-required document. (See
Respondent's Brief, pp. 31-32.) That Whittier allegedly violated state securities law through
representations in the offering documents was never part of the guilty plea, was never raised by the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and has never been ruled on by the District Court. In fact,
Houston has admitted that many of the fraud allegations in his Complaint were outside the scope of
the federal case. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 29,ll. 15-23.)
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Regardless of the outcome of the issue preclusion issue, the application of Oregon law was
prejudicial and affected Whittier's substantive rights. First, Houston has never pled any violation
of Idaho securities law. Nor did he ever seek to amend his Complaint to include any violations of
Idaho securities law despite being on notice of its potential application since at least January 14,

2008. Moreover, the wording of the Oregon and Idaho securities statutes is not identical, and the
case law interpreting each may differ substantially, leading to the potential that what is considered
a violation of an Oregon statute may not be a violation of an Idaho statute.
The errors above were further compoundedby the District Court's failure to strikeHouston's
untimely Reply Memorandum and failure to strike the Shames Affidavit as untimely or to strike
those portions of that affidavit that were inadmissible hearsay. Houston, in his Respondent's Brief,
admits that these documents were untimely filed but fails to give any reason for their untimeliness
as required under the good-cause standard.
Putting aside the issues relating to liability, the District Court improvidentlygranted summary
judgment on damages. Again, the only issues raised by the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
was whether Whittier was liable under Oregon state securities law based on && theories relating
to the Fifth Amendment and issue preclusion. The amount of damages was not within the scope of
the Motion, and the burden never shi Aed to Whittier on those factual issues. The Fifth Amendment
argument was rejected, and it is undisputed that Whittier's guilty plea did not establish, address,
include, or even mention money damages, let alone the amount allegedly suffered by Houston.
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Therefore, under the only legal theory on which summary judgment was granted, issue preclusion,
the federal guilty plea could not be used to establish damages. To use nonmaterial and irrelevant
facts to establish the amount of damages further compounded the error of granting summary
judgment on damages.
Finally, even if liability and damages were somehow established by issue preclusion, the
District Court erroneously entered judgment in favor of Houston without requiring the return of the
securities at issue. Houston has never argued that the Oregon statute regarding tender of securities
was ambiguous. He has only argued that "tender" means an offer to exchange the securities upon
complete satisfaction of the judgment, rather than prejudgment delivery of those securities. The
Oregon statute and Oregon case law do not support Houston's position.
Summary judgment should be overturned on the grounds that issue preclusion did not
establish all (or any) of theprima facie elements of a securities violation under state securities law;
that, given the scope of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Houston failed to meet his
burden of showing that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law or that the burden
of proof shifted to Whittier to establish a genuine issue of material fact on issues of liability or
damages; that Idaho, not Oregon, law applies; that the Reply Memorandum and Shames Affidavit
were untimely and should have been stricken; and that the tender-of-securities provision requires
deliverylrelinquishmentof the securities as a precondition to a judgment or, at a minimum, requires
Houston to relinquish those securities for which he receives payment.
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11. ARGUMENT

A.

Houston Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Avoeal
Houston seeks attorney fees on appeal based on three statutes. Houston does so, however,

without discussing or otherwise arguing the basis for entitlement to attorney fees except to make
conclusory statements that the appeal is "frivolous" or that the Court should take into consideration
Whittier's conduct in the District Court in addition to the filing of this appeal. But, he fails to
identify why it is Erivolous or what conduct he is referring to. Houston does not argue that he is
entitled to attorney fees as a prevailing party, nor does he describe how the sale of securities to him
personally was a commercial transaction under Idaho Code $ 12-120(3). The failure to state the basis
for his claim for attorney fees or to include any argument as to why he is entitled to attorney fees is
a ground for denying his claim. See Rule 35(b)(5), I.A.R.; Sprenger, Grubb and Assoc. v. City of
Hailey, 133 Idaho 320,986 P.2d 343 (1999); Bouten Const. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho
756,992 P.2d 751 (1999), reh 'g denied (2000).
There are additional grounds for denying Houston's claim for attorney fees on appeal. He
seeks attorney fees under ORS $59.115(10). As discussed below, Oregon law does not apply, and,
therefore, this statute does not provide a basis for attorney fees. Moreover, the statute states that,
"the c o u r t w award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action under this section."
Id. (emphasis added). This statute, of course, does not providc a basis for an award of attorney fees
unless Houston prevails. Moreover, it is not a mandatory attorney fee provision, and there were no
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attorney fees awarded by the District Court. The statute on its face appears to give a &&& court
discretion to award attorney fees and says nothing about attorney fees on an appeal.
Houston also seeks attorney fees under Idaho Code $12-120(3). This statute does not allow
for an award of attorney fees if the transaction was for personal or household purposes. Idaho Code
$12-120(3). Here, Houston personally purchased for himself the securities at issue. Houston was
not operating on behalf of a business and is not a person who is in the business of purchasing
securities. Nor were these securities purchased by a company which Houston owned or otherwise
operated. Under the circumstances, the securities transactions at issue were for personal purposes.
Therefore, Idaho Code $12-120(3)does not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees on appeal.
Finally, Houston seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code $ 12-121 claiming that
the appeal is frivolous. Whittier's appeal, however, brings legitimate issues before the Court
including what appears to be an issue of first impression regarding the interpretation of "tender" of
securities in a rescissionary action. See Purco Freight Services v. Idaho State Dep 't ofFinance, 140
Idaho 121,90 P.3d 346 (2004) (request for attorney fees on appeal was denied where issue on appeal
included the interpretation of a word in a statute presenting an issue of first impression); Ticor Title
Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007) (the issue presented, that of claim preclusion,
was one of first impression). Nor did the District Court feel that the issues raised were frivolous.

(See Tr., Vol. 1, p. 68,l. 23 - p. 69,l. 1 (THE COURT: And Mr. Thomson makes a great argument,
look at all these things that they pointed to in the application of Idaho law); p. 73,ll. 23-25 (THE
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COURT: Counsel, you both do a great job, you write great briefs, and it's a pleasure. Interesting
arguments).
There is no contract or statutorybasis for an award of attorney fees on appeal, and Houston's
request should be denied.

B.

I

t

on the Ground That Whittier Failed to Meet Rule 5 6 1 ~ Burden:
)
Nor Is Houston
Entitled to Have the Judgment Affirmed on Those Grounds

Houston argues that this Court can affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment
on grounds different than those used by the District Court, namely, that Whittier failed to object to
or offer evidence to contravene the factual record set forth byHouston. Specifically, Houston argues
that this Court can affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment based on Rule 56(c)
and (e) because Whittier did not contradict these voluminous facts and thereby did not create a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Summary judgment cannot be affirmed on these grounds.
It is a well-established rule in Idaho that review on appeal is limited to those issues raised
before the lower court and fully presented for the lower court's decision and that an appellate court
will not decide issues presented for the first time on appeal. Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of

Comm 2,110 Idaho 37,40,714 P.2d 6,9-10 (1986). See also Masters v. State, 105 Idaho 197,668
P.2d 73 (1983) (an appellant is held to the theories on which a cause was tried in the lower court and
may not raise additional or new theories on appeal); International Business Machines Corp. v.

Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984) (even if issue was arguably raised in the
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lower tribunal under liberal interpretation of pleadings, if not supported by any factual showing or
by submission of legal authority, it was not presented for lower court's decision and would not be
considered on appeal); Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179,397 P.2d 761 (1964) (the parties will be held
to the theory upon which the cause was tried in the lower court).
Houston claims he pointed out, in the District Court, that summary judgment could be
granted regardless of any issues relating to the legal theories raised by his Motion (application of
Fieh Amendment and doctrine of issue preclusion) because there are simply no facts in dispute.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 18; Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record, Ex. 3, p. 3.) He did not
do so, however, until his Reply Memorandum. (Id.) Waiting in ambush until then did not put these
nonmaterial facts at issue, especially given the clear and narrow scope ofhis Motion. That this was
not an issue properly raised or considered in the lower court is proved by the fact that the District
Court did not grant summaryjudgment on this ground or even consider whether there were genuine
issues of material fact to prevent summary judgment (other than in the context of determining that
there were none given the legal operation of issue preclusion).
Oral argument on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the District Court's
comments at oral argument make it clear that summaryjudgment was granted on legal, not factual,
grounds. Both parties and the court proceeded below on the narrow legal issues regarding the effect
of Whittier's Fifth Amendment responses in his Answer and the legal effect of issue preclusion.
MR. THOMSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
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I think Mr. Banks provided us a nice road map and I probably will try and
follow that road map as much as possible because I think it gets right to the heart of
the issues here.
Essentially, what has been asserted here is that there are two methods by
which the Court can grant summary judgment, and that is either through looking at
the answer and saying that the Fifth Amendment is an actual admission to those
charges, allegations, andlor, (2), [sic] the use of the felony guilty plea in a sort of
issue or claiin preclusion type fashion.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 38, 11. 9-20.) The District Court agreed that the legal theories asserted are what
establish the facts, not a lack of response to those facts:
THE COURT: Okay. Let me cut to the chase there. Let me tell you where
I'm at. I don't think the plaintiff would be entitled to summaryjudgment if all he had
was they haven't denied these allegations or they haven't properly denied them, all
they've done is raise a Fifth Amendment issue saying they can't admit or deny, and
because they haven't denied, we're entitled to summaryjudgment. If that's all there
was on plaintiffs side, I would say, no you can't get there from here, defendant is
right, they raise the Fifth Amendment, that doesn't operate as an admission under
these circumstances.
But he's got more. He's saying, no, I've got admissions. I've got actual
admissions. I don't need adenial anymore-orhe can't deny, he's admitted, he's gone
into federal court and said I've done these things.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 42,l. 22 - p. 43,l. 11.) Despite uncontradicted affidavits, the District Court clearly
understood that the scope of summary judgment raised only the Fifth Amendment and issue
preclusion issues and that Houston was entitled to summary judgment only if he prevailed on one
of these legal issues. Moreover, at oral argument, Houston's counsel admitted that the summary
judgment was limited to legal grounds and not to the superfluous facts he had presented and were
it not for the legal theories no summary judgment would have been filed.
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. . . Your Honor, that this really was securities fraud because, as the Court
knows, Mr. Whittier has pled guilty now to three felonious counts of securities fraud.
And I believe1 mean, that is really the basis, the backbone, of the motion for
summary judgment. There are some other issues, but were it not for that, I don't
think we would be here today.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 23,11. 16-22.)
From the beginning, this was aquickgrab at the golden ring that lulled court and counsel into
believing the issues were limited to: (1) the legal effect of a denial in the Answer based on taking
the Fifth Amendment; and (2) the legal effect of a guilty plea. Now Houston is saying that Whittier's
failure to respond to the voluminous and superfluous recitation of facts is a basis for affirming
summaryjudgment on appeal. Certainly, the District Court's analysis andultimate ruling was based
solely on an application of issue preclusion, and not on application of the Rule 56(c) standard
requiring a defendant to create a genuine issue of material fact,
THE COURT: . . . .
So, to me, the issues are decided. They're decided by virtue of his admission
and his conviction and sentence in the federal court. The issues are identical and he
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

....

That also determines that Mr. Whittier violated Oregon law by admitting to
the courts the elements of the indictment. To me, summaryjudgment is appropriate
on that point, that by making the factual admissions that he did, Mr. Whittier has
admitted-or I guess it's really up to the Court to take the factual admissions and put
them in the context of Oregon law and say do these fit, and my determination is that
they do.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 66,ll. 19-22; p. 67,l. 23 - p. 68,l. 5.)
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That the scope of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was limited to establishing the
underlying facts through the Fifth Amendment andlor issue preclusion, rather than on the actual
facts, is best shown in Houston's own description of the scope of his Motion:
Whittier has not denied the material allegations in the complaint [by taking
the Fifth Amendment], and his guilty plea in the criminal case establishes the
underlying facts as a matter of law.
(R., p. 89.) Houston's specific arguments in support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
tell the same story:
Whittier has not denied the allegations,
and they are therefore deemed
admitted. I.R.C.P. 8 ("Averments in a pleading to which responsive pleading is
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied
in ihere~ponsivepleading.").No authority supports-Whittier's request in his Answer
that his rehsal to answer [on the basis of the Fifth Amendment] be considered as a
denial. Indeed, I.R.C.P. 8(b) is clear, averments which are not denied are admitted.
Whittier's invocation of the Fifth Amendment is improper in any event. . . .
Moreover, Whittier has already admitted to his wrongdoing with respect to
Wood River in his guilty plea. SOUF 77 19-20. Principles of issue preclusion
prevent the relitigation of Whittier's misrepresentations. . . .
. . . . The issues of misrepresentation and omissions have been decided [by
issue preclusion] and the existence of those established facts creates liability as a
matter of law under ORS 59.135 and ORS 59.137.

a

(R, pp. 99-100.)
The only use by the District Court of any of the facts presented in the record was to establish
whether the elements of issue preclusion existed and which law applied, not to determine whether
these facts were true or had been disputed by Whittier in order to create a genuine issue of material
fact. In order to establish issue preclusion Houston was required to show that the alleged facts
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sought to be established were the same facts that were established by the guilty plea and are thereby
facts that were specifically admitted. Houston's attorney agreed that the facts were presented for this
limited comparison purpose:
MR. BANKS: . . . .
So, Your Honor, I think the that the point that I want to make there is not only
is the law identical, but the basic facts that support this claim that we would need to
prove in order to win this case have already been established. There's no need to
have a trial on whether these misrepresentations were made, whether there were
omissions made, because Mr. Whittier has admitted to them. And he's also
specifically admitted to the fact that they are material.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 31,l. 24 - p. 32,l. 7.) Houston was not claiming the facts were true, only that they
were the same as those in the federal case. In fact, Houston's counsel admitted that, given the
limited purpose for which the facts were presented, the facts relating to other types of securities fraud
were irrelevant and would simply he dropped.
So I think you get the flavor, Your Honor. If you go through the complaint,
you'll see that that's really what the misrepresentations are about. There are some
other ones, too, about Mr. Whittier had a bunch of credit problems and he didn't
disclose them, but that's not part of the federal case. I'm not claiming that we have
proven those allegations, but I don't think we need to prove them to succeed on our
59.135 and ORS 59.1 15 claims, which are really based on misrepresentations and
omissions. . . .
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 29,ll. 15-23.)
The only other reason the factual record was consulted was to determine which law applies
under conflicts-of-law principles.
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The only purpose of Mr. Shames' statement was to address the issue of the
application of the Oregon securities laws to the sale of Wood River to Houston, an
Oregon resident.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 20. See also R., pp. 107-09.) That is certainly how the District Court viewed
these "facts." (See, Tr., Vol. 1, p. 19,ll. 3-11; p. 20,ll. 9-12.)
Whether the actual facts are true was not within the scope of the summaryjudgment filed and
was not the basis for the grant of summary judgment by the District Court. Certainly these facts
were not fajrly or fully presented to the District Court. As such, the Rule 56(c) argument is a new
issue on appeal and cannot be a basis for affirming the summaryjudgment.

C.

It Was Error for the District Court to Allow the Filing of the Untimely Reply
Memorandum and Shames Affidavit Because Houston Failed to Give Good Cause for
His Untimeliness
Houston has conceded that both his Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment and the declaratiodaffidavit of Peter Shames wereuntimely. (See Respondent's
Brief, p. 20.) Houston also agrees that the standard to be applied for shortening the time periods is
good cause. (Id., p. 19; see also I.R.C.P. 56(c), 56(e).) However, Houston did not file a motion to
shorten time with a supporting affidavit setting forth a good-cause reason for late filings. In fact,
Houston has never provided to any court, in writing or at oral argument, good cause why the
documents were not served and received within the 7-day time period required by the rules. Instead,
Houston claims the untimeliness was harmless error and there was no prejudice. The standard is
good cause, not harmless error or prejudice. It is error to examine whether the error was harmless
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or whether there was prejudice since the focus is on the innocent party while the good-cause standard
requires a focus on and explanation from the party guilty of violating the rules.
Because Houston failed to show good cause why his Reply Memorandum and Shames'
affidavit were untimely, it was an abuse of discretion by the District Court to allow these documents
to be filed, and the District Court's decision to do so should be reversed.
D.

The District Court Erred in Determining That Oregon Securities Law Applies
Houston claims that Oregon law applies because the Oregon statutes say so. This circular

logic ignores the analysis required when there is a conflict of law. Houston points to an Oregon
statute that defines an offer to sell or to buy as one made in Oregon if it is "directed by the offeror
to [Oregon] and received at the place to which it is directed" and argues because the offer was made
in Oregon, that law applies. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 21 -22.) Idaho law, however, has a conflicting
provision that defines an offer to sell or to purchase a security as one made in Idaho if it originates
from within Idaho. Idaho Code $ 30-14-610 (c). It is the potential application of either Oregon or
Idaho state law to determine where an offer to sell or purchase a security is made that creates the
conflict which, in turn, leads to a conflicts-of-laws analysis. It is here that Houston and the District
Court lose their way.
Houston argues that because Oregon law can apply it does apply and that ends the inquiry.
This ignores the application of the conflicting Idaho law and applies one state's conflicting law to
establish that state's law's supremacy. This is an erroneous approach.

REPLY BRIEF - 14

The District Court, on the other hand, correctly determined that there was a conflict and even
properly identified the test to apply when aconflict arises-themost-significant-relationship test. The
District Court even went so far as to determine that if the most-significant-relationship test is
applied, then Idaho law applies. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 24.) Inexplicably, however, the District Court chose
to ignore its own finding that Idaho had theinost significant relationship to the subject of the lawsuit
and instead applied Oregon law. (Id.,pp. 25-26.) It did so solely on the basis that this is a securities
transaction and Oregon is the state in which the offer to sell was "made." By doing so, however, the
District Court also determined the conflicts of law based on selecting and applying the substantive
laws of Oregon on where the offer to sell was made and ignoring Idaho substantive law that also
establishes Idaho as the place the offer to sell was made. This places the cart before the horse.
Whittier has been unable to find any case law that allows a court to simply ignore the results
of the most-significant-relationshiptest and apply the other state's law solely on the basis that the
transaction at issue is one for securities. In fact, case law cited in Appellant's Brief appears to make
the application of a state's law mandatory if the most-significant-relationship test points to that state.

See Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 1 P.3d 803 (2000); Draper v. Draper,
115 Idaho 973,772 P.2d 180 (1989). In Draper, the district court tried to ignore the state with the
inost significant relationship (Oregon) in favor of the state with the most public policy concerns
(Idaho). Draper, 115 Idaho at 975, 772 P.2d at 182. This Court rejected the public policy
considerations identified by the district court and ruled that the law of the state with the most
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significant relationship applies. Draper, 115 Idaho at 975,772 P.2d at 183. Here, the District Court
did not even identify any public policy reasons for ignoring Idaho as the state with the most
significant relationship in favor of Oregon law.
There is an undisputed conflict between Idaho and Oregon law regarding where the offer was
made. When a conflict of laws arises Idaho uses the most-significant-relationship test to resolve the
conflict. Under that test Idaho's law clearly applies. (SeeAppellant's Brief, pp. 27-29 (innumerable
connections to Idaho).) It was clear error for the District Court to apply Oregon law. The Motion
for Summary Judgment should be reversed and the judgment vacated with instructions to the District
Court that Idaho law applie~.~
Nor is the application of Oregon law harmless. Houston suggests that, since the damage
provisions of the Oregon statutes are more favorable to Whittier (pointing to the one-percent
difference in interest rate), even if the District Court did commit error in applying Oregon law it
would be harmless error because it did not affect Whittier's substantive rights. Proceeding under
the wrong law does affect Whittier's substantive rights. The liability provisions of the Idaho and
Oregon statutes are not identical, and, even as to those provisions that are similar, Idaho case law
'It should be noted that if the Shames Affidavit is stricken as untimely, Houston cannot
establish even the one factor upon which the District Court ruled that Oregon law applied-that the
offer to sell was directed to and received by Houston in Oregon. As Houston states in his
Respondent's Brief, "The Shames Affidavit directly addresses the statutoty requirements of
ORS 59.345 . . . which states that a sale occurs in Oregon when the offer is directed to the state and
received at the place to which it is directed." (Respondent's Brief, p. 24.) Therefore, without this
affidavit, there was an insufficient record fiom which the District Court could determine that Oregon
law applied even under its erroneous analysis.
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interpreting those provisions inay bemore favorableto Whittier. Obviously, if Whittier is not found
liable under the more favorable Idaho law, the less favorable damage provisions are meaningless.
In Houston's Respondent's Brief he sets forth a table showing the two civil liability
provisions of the Oregon and Idaho statutes. (See Respondent's Brief, p. 26.) On their face, and as
shown in that table, the statutes are not identical. Moreover, the table fails to show that the Idaho
statute has three additional subsections that the Oregon statute does not have. C . ORS 559.1 15
(l)(b) to Idaho Code $30-14-509(b)(l)-(3). Also, the Idaho statute refers to a violation of a separate
statute, Idaho Code 530-14-301, while the Oregon statute refers to ORS $59.135(1) or (3), neither
of which have been compared for similarities or differences, and both of which are, in fact, not
identical. Indeed, both of the statutes set forth in Houston's table are but a mere fraction of the
intertwined statutory scheme governing securities that exists in both Idaho and Oregon which may
have application to this securities dispute but may be wholly different or do not even exist in the
other state's statutory scheme. In addition, Idaho's appellate courts may have analyzed various
provisions of Idaho securities law in a manner advantageous to Whittier on which Whittier would
have the right to rely had he been sued under Idaho law. To date, the District Court has only
examined Whittier's liabilityunder Oregon law and only based on issue preclusion, and neitherparty
nor the court has researched or applied Idaho law in thc context of this case.
Furthermore, Whittier's substantive due process rights have been affected. Houston has
never pled a violation of Idaho securities law. The lawsuit was decided on the basis of the
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application of Oregon law as pled. Nothing in the pleadings or the manner in which the case was
disposed of provided appropriate notice for either due process or I.R.C.P. Rule 8 notice purposes.
Not until Whittier has had a complaint filed against him setting forth the law that he is alleged to
have violated will his due process rights be respected. Entering a judgment based on violations of
inapplicable state laws is a violation of Whittier's substantive rights.

E.

The Guiltv Plea to Violating Federal securities Re~ortingReauirements Did Not
Establish Liabilitv for Alleged Violations of Ore~onSecurities Laws

1.

Issue Preclusion Must Be Decided: Summarv Jud~mentCannot Be Affirmed on
Other Grounds

Whether there are material facts in dispute under Rule 56 regarding Whittier's liability for
securities violation under Oregon law was not properly raised in the District Court, was never fully
or fairly presented or argued to the District Court, and was never decided by the District Court. For
these and the reasoils more fully discussed inza, pages 7- 13, the issue of whether Whittier failed to
dispute certain facts as a separate ground for affirming summaryjudgment should not be considered
on appeal. This Court must therefore address whether the District Court properly applied issue
preclusion to establish Whittier's liability and Houston's damages under Oregon law.'

'Of course, if Oregon was the improper law to apply, as argued above, then application of
issue preclusion to find Whittier liable under that state's law is error in and of itself.
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2.

Whittier A~reesThat the Idaho Law Relied on bv Houston for Establishing the
A~plicationof Issue Prec~usionIs Instructive

Whittier agrees that the holding in Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,731 P.2d
171 (1986), is instructive on the issues presented in this appeal and finds it supportiveof his position
that issue preclusion was erroneously applied?

Anderson makes it clear that application of issue preclusion is done on a case-by-case
analysis. While the test used to analyze issue preclusion set forth in Anderson applies, the
application of that test shows that issue preclusion does not establish Whittier's liability for
Houston's damages under state securities law. For instance, the Anderson court did not determine
that a guilty plea to violation of a criminal statute established liability in a civil rights action. The
only issue established as a result of the criminal conviction was that the civil rights complainant
"was estopped from denying that he had pointed his shotgun at someone, at some point." Anderson,
112 Idaho at 185,73 1 P.2d at 180. Likewise, Whittier's plea of guilty to criminal federal securities
provisions limited to requiring certain filings does not establish all elements of liability under
different state securities laws which have no filing requirement counterpart. At most, as in

Anderson, the guilty plea established that Whittier failed to file specific reports with the SEC.
However, to the extent that is established, it does not establish liability under state securities law
since the failing to file an SEC report is not a violation thereof.
41nterestingly,Houston relies on Idaho case law that in turn interprets an Idaho statute for
purposes of examining Whittier's liability under issue preclusion but insists that Whittier's liability
for securities fraud must be determined under Oregon law.
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3.

The Issues Decided bv the Guiltv Plea Were Not Identical to the Issues
Presented in the State Securities Action: Nor Were the Issues S o u ~ h to
t Be
Precluded Actuallv Decided bv That Guiltv Plea
a.

The Issues Decided Were Not Identical to the Issues Presented

Houston attempts to bolster the District Court's application of issue preclusion by claiming:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the federal and state statutes are identical;
one criminal count is virtually identical to one cause of action in the civil complaint;
the facts are identical; and
the conduct to which Whittier pled guilty in the federal action is the same conduct
that defrauded Houston.

The federal and state statutes at issue are not identical. Houston compared Oregon state law
to federal law. Since Oregon law does not apply, the comparison is irrelevant. The issue is whether
&&law

is identical to federal law, and this has never been fully developed. Regardless, on their

face, the Oregon and federal statutes are not identical. (See cJ:table, Respondent's Brief, p. 3 1.) Nor
has there been any comparison of the other intertwined and interrelated statutes of either the federal
or state statutory scheme or common law interpreting either. In fact, the only case law discovered
by Whittier regarding the similarities between federal and Oregon securities law and whether a
violation of one is a violation of the other rejects this theory:
Plaintiffs have asked me to supplement my opinion of November 28, 1972,
to add a provision that the defendants' violations of Federal Securities Law,
Rule lob-5 (17 C.F.R. 240.1Ob-5), also constituteviolationsof the Oregon Securities
Law, ORS 59.1 15 and ORS 59.135. Because Rule lob-5 is similar to ORS 59.135,
plaintiffs contend that a violation of the federal law must also be a violation of the
state law. In the complaint and in the pretrial order, plaintiffs sought relief under
both federal and state securities law.
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This case was originally filed in June, 1970. Since then, plaintiffs have
submitted many voluminous briefs and memoranda containing a great number of
legal authorities. All of them dealt solely with federal law. Plaintiffs did not discuss
whether ORS 59.115 and 59.135 provide the same remedies or create the same
liabilities as Rule lob-5. They did not cite a case construing the Oregon statutes.
The only Oregon case brought to my attention is contrary to the plaintiffs' position.
Zucker v. Parker, et al., No. 371-069 (Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, County
of Multnomah, November 3, 1972).
The motion to supplement the opinion is denied.

Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F.Supp. 255,267 (D.Or. 1972). Even though the plaintiff in Blakely sought
relief under both federal and Oregon state securities laws (which Houston did not), the Oregon court
was not persuaded that violation of federal law was automatically a violation of Oregon law.
Nor is it relevant that one count in the federal indictment is similar (or even identical) to one
of the claims in the civil complaint. (See Respondent's Brief, p. 30.) Comparison must be between
the puiltv olea and the claims in the Complaint sought to be established on summary judgment.
Whittier did not plead guilty to the entire indictment or even to all allegations supporting the counts
in the indictment. (Certificate of Exhibits, Ex. 1, Ex. C, pp. 14-15.) Whittier only pled guilty to
concealing the size of his beneficial ownership in EndWave by failing to timely or accurately file
forms required by the SEC. (Id.) So, the fact that the indictment generally alleged a scheme to
defraud through representations made in the Confidential Private Offering Meinorandm or that the
h n d was being audited by outside auditors is irrelevant to whether the more narrow guilty plea
actually established in the state court action those misrepresentations or a lack of auditing.
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Many of the same facts are, indeed, alleged in both actions. The facts underlying the guilty
plea, however, are those relating to the timing of or failure to file the SEC filings. These facts were
not alleged in the state court complaint because Houston did not allege violations of federal
securities law. Thus, the facts material to the legal issues are not identical.
For the same reason, the conduct to which Whittier pled guilty is not the same conduct that
Houston claims defrauded him. Houston claims he was defrauded by the representations set forth
in the Confidential Private Offering Memorandum, including representations in that document that
the portfolios were diversified, that outside auditors were involved and Whittier's failure to divulge
alleged credit problems. Whittier did not plead guilty to any of these actions or allegations. Nor has
Houston alleged that he was defrauded by Whittier's failure to file the SEC reports. Houston has
not alleged he had access to these reports, or looked for thein and when he did not find them decided
to invest, or in any other manner relied on SEC reporting requirements for his investment decision.
The issues decided by the federal guilty plea are not identical, or even similar, to the issues
presented in this case. Therefore, one of the elements of issue preclusion is missing. Summary
judgment should be reversed and the judgment based thereon should be vacated,

b.

The Issues to Be Precluded Were Never Actuallv Decided bv the Guiltv
Plea
-

There were two issues established by the District Court based on Whittier's guilty plea in the
federal criminal action: (1) Whittier's liability under Oregon's securities law; and (2) Houston's
damages. Neither was decided by the guilty plea. First, no violation of Oregon state law was ever
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alleged, prosecuted, or plead guilty to in the federal criminal action. Nor did Houston allege
violations of federal securities laws in his state lawsuit. So, the question is whether the guilty plea
actually decided all (or any) of the separate elements of Whittier's liability under Oregon securities
law or the amount of Houston's damages.
The guilty plea was limited to violating specific SEC regulations requiring certain forms to
be filed. No such violations were the basis of the alleged violations of Oregon securities law. Nor
could they be, since Oregon law does not have a similar reporting requirement and no provision of
Oregon law makes failing to file a report with the SEC securities fraud. Therefore, pleading guilty
to the unique, federal violations does not establish=

element of liability under Oregon state law.

Even if the specific, unlimited guilty plea can be said to establish securities fraud generally,
it does not establish all of the specific elements of Oregon statutory securities fraud particularly. For
instance, the guilty plea did not establish that Houston "was unaware of the untrue statements and
omissions when he made purchases," an element of liability under Oregon securities law.' In other
words, Houston's state of mind was never decided by Whittier's guilty plea.
The error is even more evident in the grant of summaryjudgment on damages. If this Court
accepts that the scope of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the only properly presented
issues were the two legal issues related to the Fifth Amendment and issue preclusion, then,perfovce,
'This was an erroneous factual finding by the District Court under the wrong rule-Rule 56(d)
I.R.C.P. Issue preclusion cannot extend to making this fact-specific, subjective finding. There was
no need to be concerned with Houston's state of mind in the criminal action. Rule 56(d) only
provides for establishing findings of fact that still need to be tried.
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it was error for the District Court to grant summaryjudgment on the amount of damages allegedly
suffered by Houston. Facts regarding damages were never put at issue by the Motion. It is
undisputed that absolutely nothing in the guilty plea could establish the specific damages allegedly
suffered by Houston. The grant of summaryjudgmentwas limited to application of issue preclusion
(or should have been), and any resort to the facts beyond that necessary to address that legal theory
along with conflicts of law was error. The District Court's resort to facts related to damages to
determine the amount was error.
Two of the elements for application of issue preclusion are missing. The grant of summary
judgment as to liability and damages should be reversed and the judgment vacated.

F.

Houston Failed to Make the P r o ~ e Preiud~ment
r
Tender of Securitiesand Is Therefore
Not Entitled to a Judgment in Anv Amount
Houston agrees that he is required to "tender his securities prior to entry ofjudgment against

a defendant" under Oregon law. (Respondent's Brief, p. 33.) Indeed, ORS 59.1 15 states that a
purchaser may recover the consideration paid for the security and interest froin the date of payment
only "upon tender of the security." ORS §59.115(2). And, tender must be made before entry of
judgment. ORS 559.1 15(5). Judgment was entered on March 19,2008. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 166-68.)
The only prejudgment 'tender' by Houston is in a letter dated March 3,2008, stating:
We are tendering to you Howard Houston's rights, title, and interest in the Wood
River Partners securities, which we will deliver upon receipt of payment by your
client or others of the full amount of the principal and interest stated in the proposed
judgment.
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(R., p. 140.) It must be noted that this letter in no way tenders the securities themselves as required
by the plain wording of Oregon law. It merely tenders Houston's right, title, and interest in those
securities. Nor is it an unconditional tender of the securities since it states that they will not be
delivered until the judgment has been fully satisfied. A tender, by definition, is unconditional. See
BLACK'SDICTIONARY
(8th ed.). The Oregon statutes do not say that tender occurs only after the
judgment has been fully satisfied. The statute requires tender & to judgment being entered.
While Houston may not like the result, that is what the plain terms of the statute require. Houston's
conditional 'tender' indicating that actual delivery will not occur until after the judgment has been
fi~& satisfied does not meet the tender requirements of the statute. Therefore, it was error for the

District Court to enter judgment against Whittier without first requiring actual tender (delivery) of
the securities.
At a minimum, Houston admits that he is required to file partial satisfactions of judgment
whenever he receives any recovery from any source. (Respondent's Brief, p. 34.) Both sides agree
that Houston has already or will receive partial payments of the judgment before it is fully satisfied.
Consequently, at a minimum, Houston is required to deliveryirelinquish the securities for which he
has already received payment. Otherwise, it is he who will receive a windfall if in fact the
liquidation of Wood River's holdings provides payment to the holders of the securities. Those
securities equal to that portion of the judgment that has been paid must be relinquished by Houston.
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CONCLUSION
The District Court's grant of smaryjudgment to Houston should bereversed, thejudgment
vacated, and the case remanded to the District Court with instructions to proceed to trial for a
determination of the actual facts, based on Idaho law, and if a future judgment is entered that
Houston must deliver or relinquish all of the Wood River securities before judgment is entered.
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